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On October 9
th
 2009 the Institute for Science, Innovation and Society and the Oxford 
Centre for Entrepreneurship and Innovation hosted a workshop on Strategic Unknowns: 
the usefulness of ambiguity and ignorance in organization life. The meeting provoked 
much dialogue and debate about the 75 participants, who ranged from students and 
faculty at SBS, the wider University, and numerous academic institutions and policy 
institutes throughout the UK and Europe.  
 
Linsey McGoey, convenor of the meeting, offered opening remarks, thanking the hosts 
and organizers, with particular thanks to co-organizers Matthew Harris, a former research 
fellow at SBS now working at King’s College, and Emily Davis at OxCEI. McGoey set 
the stage for the talks by referencing a variety of literature in the social sciences on the 
strategic uses of ambiguity and ignorance, stressing that ignorance should not be treated 
as the absence of knowing or understanding, but as a productive force in itself, often 
harnessed by managers, politicians and policymakers as a way to assert authority, 
command funding, and exonerate liability in the aftermath of disasters.  
 
Jacqueline Best, from the University of Ottawa, was the first speaker, offering a 
description of how policymakers at the IMF have alternatively sought to dispel and to 
magnify ambiguity when implementing conditionality policies. IMF conditionality – 
where a country must implement a range of economic policies in order to receive funding 
– is a framework that has undergone numerous rhetorical and practical reconfigurations 
since the IMF’s inception in the 1940s. Best noted that since John Maynard Keynes’ 
insistence that conditionality should not be imposed as a prerequisite for receiving IMF 
loans, to the Asian crisis of the late 1990s, when “in some cases over one hundred 
conditions” were placed on recipient countries, the guidelines governing IMF conditions 
have been consistently ambiguous. Moreover, Best noted that the ambiguity surrounding 
the efficacy and the implementation of conditions, through fostering “future flexibility in 
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interpretation,” is often used strategically “by those in the best position to take advantage 
of that interpretive power.” Yet the very ambiguity of the guidelines makes it difficult for 
any one institutional actor to maintain their strategic advantage over the longer term. 
 
Said Business School’s Marc Ventresca drew on an empirical analysis of changing 
structures at international stock exchanges in order to critically interrogate the question of 
why ambiguity has been under-examined by management and institutional theorists over 
the past 40 years. Overwhelmingly more focused on “uncertainty reduction” at the 
expense of recognizing the persistence of ambiguity as both a hindrance and a resource in 
organizational life, Ventresca suggested the dearth of attention to ambiguity might stem 
from the de facto assumption that eliminating uncertainty is the best strategy when faced 
with competing decisions. Drawing on Ventresca and Hallett’s notion of “inhabited 
institutionalism,” where organizations must grasp the diverse cultures and interests of 
those living within institutions, recognizing the ways that conflicting cultures might 
compound the unintended effects of decisions taken to reduce uncertainty, Ventresca’s 
talk charted new avenues for embracing ambiguity as a useful tool for understanding the 
limits and possibilities of organizational change.  
 
Christian Borch, from Copenhagen Business School, considered the strategic use of 
ignorance in light of Foucault and Rose’s assertions that forms of governance are 
intimately tied to the ability to visualize and track the mobility of political subjects 
through a range of cartographic and surveillance techniques. He asked the question of, if 
knowledge is linked to vision, could strategies of ignorance be intimately bound up with 
other senses, such as touch, smell and hearing?, then drew on crowd theory developed by 
Canetti, Tarde and Le Bon in order to consider whether the fear of the “touch of the 
unknown” (Canetti) was something leading the “crowd” to act in alternatively strategic or 
irrational ways. Borch’s talk raised the parallel question of whether, in general, through 
privileging the association of knowledge with the ability to visualize the movements of 
populaces, social theorists have tended to ignore the ways both democratic and non-
democratic regimes exploit non-visual senses for political and economic gain. 
 
Brian Rappert, University of Exeter, examined the practices of secrecy, deception and 
ignorance deployed by various policymakers and state officials seeking to either halt or to 
enact an international treaty prohibiting the use of cluster bombs, a type of explosive that 
scatters smaller bombs over large areas. Rappert’s talk addressed some of the 
methodological and epistemological challenges of studying the strategic use of 
unknowns; including how social research into ignorance can itself entail the production 
of ignorance. He described how officials, NGOs, and academics strategically sought to 
expose what others with opposite political stances did not know about the humanitarian 
effects of cluster bombs in order to defend the need for a treaty. In other words, Rappert 
suggested how a precautionary form of ignorance – exposing the non-knowledge that 
prevailed in this area – was used as part of the argumentative strategies to negotiate a 
comprehensive international treaty.   
 
Carol Heimer, at Northwestern University, draw on empirical fieldwork at five HIV 
centres, located in the US, Uganda, South Africa, and Thailand, in order to examine the 
ways that organizations conceal their ignorance by carefully collecting and disseminating 
more information. Relating her study to work in management and social theory on 
“ceremonial forms of compliance,” Heimer discussed how strategic ignorance is 
deployed as a tactic for researchers faced with the task of having to communicate risks in 
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order to obtain informed consent, while at the same time seeking to mitigate or 
undermine the magnitude of the risks they are forced to convey. In order to fulfil research 
needs and enrol patients in clinical trials, trial investigators must create more ambiguity 
about how dangerous or safe risks actually are in practice, something that conflicts with 
the often elusive and impractical goal of trying to clarify risks on informed consent 
forms.   
 
Steve Rayner, Institute for Society, Innovation and Society, Said Business School, gave 
the final keynote lecture of the day. He outlined a number of research projects he had 
been involved with as a director, participant or observer in order to explore how 
ignorance is constructed in practice to allow individuals to function as if they are unaware 
of the “uncomfortable knowledge” inconvenient for them to acknowledge or to act on. He 
listed four “D’s” useful in examining the social construction of ignorance: denial, 
dismissal, displacement and decoy, and sketched out empirical examples of their use in 
practice. He then invited Steve Woolgar, one of the chairs at the meeting, to reflect on 
how strategies of ignorance, as well as strategies of knowledge, relate to techniques to 
“configure the user” (Woolgar) – or to predetermine what the user of a new technology 
will want to know or to gain from a new innovation. Rayner suggested that 
preconceptions about what the potential users of a new technology will want to avoid 
knowing, or are incapable of understanding, often factor in problematic ways in public 
understanding of science exercises.  
 
Brian Balmer, University College London, and Noortje Marres, InSIS, Said Business 
School, offered closing remarks. Balmer drew on his previous research in order to 
describe how, much as the credibility of knowledge claims are contingent on one’s social 
or political position, the ability to draw on strategic ignorance and to express “legitimate 
doubt” about a phenomenon are often linked to the scientific and social capital an 
individual possesses. He stressed that social scientists should examine the social and 
political context of ignorance claims when examining the strategic uses of ambiguity and 
non-knowledge in practice.  
 
During her closing comments, Noortje Marres cautioned against the temptation to 
attribute excessive novelty to discussions of the usefulness of ignorance and ambiguity in 
political and organizational life. She stressed that the value of ignorance has long been 
acknowledged and examined by social scientists and philosophers, from Aristotle and 
Plato, to work during the 20
th
-century from pragmatists such as Lippmann, to STS 
scholars today. In comments that raised parallels to Borch’s talk, Marres pointed out that 
Lippmann, for example, was focused on how knowledge and ignorance of the crowd’s 
dynamics and desires have been central to work in democratic theory.  
 
Balmer and Marres’ closing comments were followed by an open discussion among all 
participants which raised important avenues for future inquiries: How do strategies of 
ignorance and ambiguity relate to work on social and political control? What are the 
ethical questions raised by a focus on ignorance? How does work on ignorance and 
ambiguity contrast with work in STS and political theory on the ways that knowledge is 
linked to the maintenance or disruption of political or economic authority? These 
questions and others will be addressed in the special journal issue forthcoming shortly.   
 
 
